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ARGUMENT
A. The Listing Agreement Unambiguously Requires The Payment Of
Commissions On Any And AH Lease Renewals.
Zions Holding Company (hereinafter "Zions") correctly states that Tom Heal
Commercial Real Estate, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Heal") position is that the contract
(hereinafter "Listing Agreement") between Zions and Heal is unambiguous. Brief of
Appellees at 13. Heal again states that its interpretation of the Listing Agreement is the
only reasonable unambiguous reading of the Listing Agreement and the only
interpretation that gives full affect to all of the words as plainly written in the Listing
Agreement and as required by the Utah Supreme Court. See Fairbourne Commercial v.
America Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004). Although Zions properly brings to this
Court's attention the proper analysis for interpreting the Listing Agreement, Zions gives
no support as to why the district court's application of that analysis is correct. The correct
application of the steps outlined in the district court's decision can only lead to the
conclusion that Zions is liable to Heal for commissions on all lease renewals of the initial
lease.
Zions argues that Heal's interpretation of the Listing Agreement is flawed because
"it fails to harmonize appropriately paragraphs 2 and 3 in the Agreement." Zion's then
states that Utah case law requires a court to "consider each contract provision . . . in
relation to all of the other with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none."
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Green River Canal Co., v. Thayne, 84 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2003). Heal agrees with
Zions that such an interpretation should occur but asserts that the district court's
interpretation of the Listing Agreement, although attempting to comply with this standard,
fails to reasonably interpret the Listing Agreement, ignores the plain meaning, ignores
significant portions of the Listing Agreement and thus in effect, rewrites the agreement.
Again, for the convenience of the Court, the paragraphs in question, paragraphs 2 and 3
of the Listing Agreement, provide as follows:
2. BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company,
the Seller's Agent, The Seller, another real estate agent, or anyone else
locates a party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange
(collectively referred to as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at
the listing price and terms stated on the attached property data information
form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing,
the Seller agrees to pay to the Company a brokerage fee in the amount of
six percent (6%) of such acquisition price. In the case of a lease of the
Property, the commission shall be the commission percentage times the
aggregate of all lease payments during the full term of the lease. Seller
shall be obligated to pay a commission on [sic] of six percent (6%) on any
and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals. The brokerage fee,
unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be
due and payable on (a) the date of closing of the acquisition of the Property;
or (b) 50% due and payable when the lease is signed, and 50% due and
payable upon the first day of the lease commencement; or (c) the first day of
the lease renewal commencement; or (d) the date the option is signed.
3. PROTECTION PERIOD. If within twenty-four months after
the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the Property is
acquired by a party to whom the Property was offered or shown by the
Company, the Seller's Agent, the Seller, another real estate agent, or by any
other person during the Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to the
Company the brokerage fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated
to pay a brokerage fee on such acquisition to another brokerage pursuant to
another valid listing contract entered into after the expiration or termination
date of this Listing Agreement.
5

Listing Agreement paragraphs 2 and 3.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Listing Agreement are in harmony as written in the
agreement and provide for two independent alternative scenarios. When reading these
two paragraphs it is important to note that both paragraphs begin with the word "if. The
word " i f is commonly defined as meaning "in the event that: allowing that: [or] on
condition that." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 598 (1984). In interpreting
these two paragraphs the district court ignores the affect of the "ifs." See Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law If 6. Remembering that the word " i f
means "in the event thaf or "on condition thaf and using this meaning when reading
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Listing Agreement, it is clear that these paragraphs apply only
when certain conditions or events occur.
Paragraph 2 applies "[in the event that] during the Listing Period, [Heal] locates a
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to as
"acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing price and terms stated on the
attached property data information form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller
may agree in writing . . . " Listing Agreement Paragraph 2. Reading paragraph 2 with
emphasis placed on the " i f indicates that paragraph 2 applies "in the event thaf Heal
finds a lessee during the Listing Period (the Listing Period is defined in the Listing
Agreement) and said lessee leases the property during the Listing Period. The district
court's findings of fact, paragraphs 2, 4 and 7, indicate Heal located a lessee of the
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property during the Listing Period, and the lessee entered into a lease during the Listing
Period. Because Heal located a "ready, willing and able" lessee during the Listing Period,
all of paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement applies to that transaction, including the
sentence stating "[s]eller shall be obligated to pay a commission on [sic] of six percent
(6%) on any and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals." The district court's
interpretation gives no affect to this sentence.
Paragraph 3 of the Listing Agreement applies "[in the event that] within twentyfour months after the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the Property is
acquired by a party to whom the Property was offered or shown by [Heal] during the
Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to [Heal] the brokerage fee stated in Section 2 . . . "
This event or condition did not occur because Heal had already provided a ready, willing
and able" lessee during the Listing Period. In fact, because Heal located a lessee during
the Listing Period and that lessee leased the property duriag the Listing Period, the event
or condition in paragraph 3 of the Listing Agreement was rendered moot. Therefore,
paragraphs 2 and 3 are in harmony because the paragraphs provide for two alternative
independent scenarios, a contractual "fork in the road" that provides for harmonious
interpretation of the Listing Agreement no matter what path Heal and the lessee travel on
toward the lease of the property.
Zions is apparently confused about the fact that "[n]owhere in his Brief does Heal
address the interrelationship of and specific reference to Section 2. Brokerage Fee in
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Section 3 of the Agreement, (3. Protection Period. "...Seller agrees to pay to the
Company the brokerage fee stated in Section 2...") with the payment of a commission."
Appellee's brief at 15 (emphasis in original). Heal addresses the "interrelationship of and
specific reference to Section 2" in Section 3, consistent with the plain meaning of the
Listing Agreement, by stating that paragraph 2 simply provides instruction as to the
commissions to be paid Heal in the event that the triggering event of paragraph 3 occurs.
In this case the triggering event did not occur because the lessee located by Heal leased
the property during the Listing Period, not during the Protection Period and therefore
paragraph 2 provides all of the information needed to determine the brokerage fees owed
to Heal. The district court erroneously attempted to harmonize these paragraphs, in
essence overanalyzing the Listing Agreement under a condition that did not occur and
created an interpretation of the agreement that is not in harmony with the plain language
of the agreement.
Assuming arguendo that paragraph 3 does in some way apply to the factual
scenario between Heal and Zions, and harmonization of the paragraphs is necessary, Heal
offers the only reasonable reading of paragraph 3. The reference to paragraph 2 in
paragraph 3 of the Listing Agreement simply refers the reader to paragraph 2 to determine
the amount and timing of the brokerage fees due to Heal. In the event that Paragraph 3
applies, the Listing Agreement plainly states: "the Seller agrees to pay to the Company
the brokerage fee stated in Section 2." Thus, a "harmonization" of paragraphs 2 and 3
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can only lead to the conclusion that the brokerage fees are to be paid as outlined in
paragraph 2 and paragraph 2 clearly calls for a commission on any and all lease renewals
regardless of when such renewal occurs.
Thus, only two events can trigger the payment of brokerage fees under the Listing
Agreement: 1) a lease of the property during the Listing Period as outlined in paragraph 2;
or 2) if a lease is not consummated during the Listing Period, a lease of the property
occurs during the Protection Period by a lessee located b> Heal during the Listing Period
as outlined in paragraph 3. The above two conditions are contractually harmonious, a
virtual "fork in the road" when interpreting the Listing Agreement. In this case, Heal
located a lessee during the Listing Period and the lessee leased the property during the
Listing Period. Therefore, the condition for paragraph 2 1o apply occurred. Nonetheless,
regardless of which of the above two scenarios occurs, the brokerage fees due to Heal are
always controlled by paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement and require the payment of
fees on "any and all lease renewals." Zions is therefore liable to Heal for the
commissions on the lease renewal entered into between Zions and the lessee located by
Heal.
B. Enforcing All Of The Terms Of Paragraph 2 Of The Listing Agreement
Does Not Change The Bargain Between The Parties.
Zions states that "Heal and the Amicus Curiae improperly request that this Court
change the bargain entered into by the parties on the basis of supposed equitable
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principles, i.e., that the parties' intent should be gleaned from and inserted into the
Agreement by the Court based on the standard in the industry." Zions misunderstands
Heal's argument. Heal's argument is simply that the bargain between the parties is
plainly expressed in the Listing Agreement: "seller shall be obligated to pay a commission
on [six] of six percent (6%) on any and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals."
Listing Agreement Paragraph 2. Heal asserts that the amicus brief merely supports Heal's
interpretation of the plain meaning of the Listing Agreement by explaining the plain
meaning and industry wide purpose of a "Protection Period." The amicus brief, filed by
the National and Utah Associations of Realtors, merely supports Heal's interpretation of
the contract.
Zions further states that the "Court cannot do for Heal what Heal himself failed to
do." Heal did not fail to outline the parties' true intent in the body of the contract. The
contract is clear and unambiguous and the district court should not be allowed to interpret
it in a way that renders certain parts of the contract meaningless, especially given the
"Utah Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement to (1) [fully] consider each provision
and (2) 'ignore none.'" Appellee Brief at 15 (citing Fairbourne Commercial v. American
Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004). The Listing Agreement specifically calls for a
commission on "any and all lease renewals" and the district court's interpretation renders
this phrase meaningless. The district court should not be allowed to do for Zions what
Zions failed to do for itself. The parties were in equal bargaining position and by
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interpreting the contract as it has the district court has rendered an unreasonable
interpretation of the contract and in essence rewrote the agreement to include terms which
neither party bargained for.
CONCLUSION
The district court's interpretation of the Listing Agreement, although attempting to
comply with Utah standards for interpreting contracts fails to reasonably interpret the
contact, ignores the plain meaning of the contract, rewrites the contract and fails to fully
consider each provision in the contact. A true harmonization of all of the terms of the
contract can only lead to the conclusion that since Heal found a ready, able and willing
lessee of the property during the Listing Period and said lessee entered into a lease with
Zions during the Listing Period, Zions is liable to Heal for a commission on each and
every lease renewal of the initial lease as provided in paragraph 2 of the Listing
Agreement.
DATED this 2*\ day of November, 2004
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Jeremy C. ftnk
Attorneys for Appellants
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